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The
entire debate on Kashmiri separatism, as also the recent resurgence of the
controversy over 'autonomy' has substantially ignored the enormous plurality of
the State of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). To some extent, the regional
identity of Jammu and the plight of the exiled Kashmiri pandits
have received limited - though entirely inadequate - attention in the media and
in some of the ill-informed political debates on the subject. But the
relationship between the Muslim dominated regional Centre at Srinagar and the
complexities, conflicts and identities within the Ladakh sub-region have been
entirely neglected, not only in the public debate, but also by the political
executive both in Srinagar and in Delhi, as also by the various departments that
were supposed to be monitoring the situation in this forgotten Himalayan
hinterland. That there is even less understanding of the dynamics of sub-regional
identities, such as Kargil's relationship with Leh, and Zanskar's with Kargil,
is, consequently, entirely unsurprising within this context of general neglect.
Recent
events in the State, however, have forced at least the transient acknowledgement
of a problem in Ladakh. The J&K State Assembly's decision to pass a
resolution seeking the restoration of Kashmir's special status to a 'pre-1953'
position spurred the minority communities in the State — the people of Jammu,
the Ladakhi Buddhists and the Kashmiri Pandits — to revive their demands for
autonomy and, increasingly, separation from the Valley. In June 2000, an
agitation was launched by the Ladakhi Buddhists, led by the Ladakhi Buddhist
Association (LBA), to press their demand for Union Territory status. The
agitation brought an immediate — albeit passing — focus on their grievances.
This paper traces the origin of their difficulties — political, economic and
social — and of their demands for direct administration from New Delhi; and
the political and strategic implications of these for the State as well as the
central governments, especially within the context of the crisis scenario that
emerged as a result of the conflict in Kargil.
The
Ladakh region consists of a Buddhist-majority Leh district and Shia
Muslim-majority Kargil, originally part of Baltistan, which has a small Buddhist
minority concentrated in the Zanskar area. Its area of 95,876 square kilometres
constitutes 60 per cent of the State’s area, albeit sparsely populated (with
2.27 per cent of the State's population). LBA's demand for Union Territory
status emanates from deep-rooted alienation and a widely shared perception among
the Ladakhi Buddhists of having been treated as a 'colony' by the Kashmiris and,
over the last five decades, they have launched several rounds of agitation to
achieve this objective.
Buddhist-majority
Ladakh had strong reservations and insecurities with regard to the transfer of
power from the Dogra Maharaja, Hari Singh, to a Kashmiri administration under
Sheikh Abdullah in 1949. The Ladakhis did not identify themselves with the
Kashmiris, and were further alienated by the iniquitous power structure and
partisan policies of the Abdullah government. The Constituent Assembly
(dominated by Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference) had created a unitary state
with a clear concentration of powers in the Valley. The Constitution did not
recognise the federal principle of organising political power to create
equitable representation for the underlying social and cultural heterogeneity of
society in the State. Sheikh Abdullah painstakingly constructed a 'monolith
structure' that emphasised "one organisation (the National Conference) one
leader (Shiekh Abdullah) and one programme (Naya
Kashmir)."
What
resulted in the name of 'majority rule' was, in fact, 'Kashmiri rule'. Ladakh
had only two seats in the State Assembly and Sheikh Abdullah’s five-member
cabinet had no representative from the region. What followed was an unending
succession of discriminatory policies that created an unbridgeable hiatus
between the Valley and Ladakh.
Thus,
in the wake of the Pakistani raiders' attacks in 1947-48, the Muslim refugees in
the Valley had received substantial state aid, but no resources were sanctioned
for rehabilitating the Buddhist refugees of the Zanskar area, nor was any
financial aid granted for reconstructing and restoring the gompas — Buddhist temples that were the life and soul of the local
religion and culture. The small relief provided by the Government of India never
reached Zanskar; it was distributed among the Muslims of Suru Karste area in the
Kargil tehsil. The studied indifference with
which the State government transferred Zanskar to the Leh tehsil
was in marked contrast to the way Doda was readily carved out as a separate
Muslim-majority district in the Jammu region. Land reforms initiated in the
State were perceived as targeting the gompas
and elicited strong criticism from the Buddhist clergy. Indeed, Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru had to intervene to persuade the State government to suspend
the application of the Land Reforms Act to the gompas.
The
decisions of the Sheikh Abdullah government to impose Urdu in Ladakhi schools,
to discontinue scholarships for children of backward areas, and the termination
of grants-in-aid provided by the Dogra regime for three primary schools run by
Shias, Sunnis and Buddhists were also strongly resented. No allocation
whatsoever was made in the first budget for Ladakh’s development. Kushak
Bakula protested in the State Assembly: "Read the Budget statement from one
end to the other, you will not find Ladakh mentioned even once." In fact, there was no separate
plan for Ladakh till 1961. Finally, Maulana Masoodi’s statements regarding the
communal composition of Ladakh being a Muslim-majority district created grave
misgivings that the government planned to officially relegate the Buddhists to
complete political irrelevance.
The
biased and discriminatory policies of the Kashmiri leadership provided an
impetus for the politicisation of the Ladakhi Buddhists. Being a minority
community in the State and anxious to protect their distinct religion and
culture, they wanted to take an independent decision about their political
future. Ladakhi Buddhists were projected as a "separate nation by all the
tests — race, language, religion and culture — determining a
nationality." They emphasised historical links
with the Dogras of Jammu rather than with the Kashmiri Muslims. Two sets of
arguments were offered. Since Sheikh Abdullah’s case rested upon the Treaty of
Amritsar, the Maharaja’s transfer of power was valid for Kashmir Valley alone,
as Ladakh’s relationship with the Dogras was governed by a separate treaty
resulting from the War of 1834, 12 years before the Treaty of Amritsar came into
force, in which the Valley did not figure. Second, the arrangements which
subjected the Ladakhis to the Dogras had ceased to be operative, like the Treaty
of Amritsar, breaking the constitutional link tying the Ladakhis to the State of
J&K, and they were morally and juridically free to choose their course,
independent of the rest of the State.
A memorandum submitted to Prime Minister Nehru on May 4, 1949, by
Cheewang Rigzin, President, LBA, pleaded that Ladakh not be bound by the
decision of a plebiscite, should the Muslim majority of the State decide in
favour of Pakistan. They sought to be
governed directly by the Government of India, or to be amalgamated with the
Hindu-majority parts of Jammu to form a separate province, or to join East
Punjab. Failing all options, they would be forced to consider the option of
reuniting with Tibet. The strategic and commercial importance of neighbouring
Tibet and China, with Leh as the nerve centre of the Central Asian trade, was
underlined.
Empathising
with the Ladakhis, the then Sadar-i-Riyasat,
Dr. Karan Singh, acknowledged that,
“…even
more so than in Jammu, the Ladakhis were feeling uneasy and insecure under the
Sheikh’s administration. Forming as they did a distinct cultural entity, they
felt that their position in the new dispensation with only two members in the
State Assembly (on the basis of population) was extremely precarious and made
them totally subordinate to the Kashmiris. They urged that instead of leaving
them at the mercy of the Sheikh’s government, an Administrator should be sent
from the Centre to the Region.”
Sheikh
Abdullah's Regime: Promises & Disappointments
The
National Conference government accepted Ladakh's demand for a Central
Administrator, but never implemented the decision. While Nehru shared the
Ladakhis' concerns, he persuaded the Ladakhi Buddhist delegation not to press
its demands, since any constitutional or administrative action could weaken
India’s stand on Kashmir in the UN Security Council. National Conference
members from Ladakh then sought internal autonomy from the Kashmir Valley.
Kushak Bakula demanded federal status for Ladakh in 1952.
The Ladakh unit of the National Conference called for the institution of
an elected Statutory Advisory Committee, and demanded that no measures affecting
the political, economic or religious life of Leh tehsil would be passed by the State's Constituent Assembly without
prior approval of this body. The main demands of the Ladakhis included the
formation of a Ministry of Ladakh Affairs headed by a popularly elected Ladakhi
member of the Legislative Assembly; adequate representation in the legislature
and civil service; establishing Panchayat
and Rural Development Departments; development funds for constructing roads and
canals and promoting agriculture and horticulture; and replacement of the
Kashmiri police by local personnel. They wanted Bodhi, their mother tongue, to
be made the medium of instruction for school education, and special provisions
to be made for facilitating higher education and training in medicine, law,
engineering, agriculture and forestry.
Kushak Bakula argued that Ladakh would bear essentially the same
relationship to the J&K State as Kashmir to India, with the local
legislature being the only competent authority to make laws for Ladakh.
Initially,
Sheikh Abdullah and Jawaharlal Nehru agreed to the State Constitution granting
limited regional autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh. The Basic Principles Committee of
the Constituent Assembly was entrusted with this task and a plan was prepared to
establish five autonomous regions: Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Gilgit, Ladakh and a
region comprising the districts of Mirpur, Rajouri, Poonch and Muzaffarabad.
Three provinces, namely, Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Poonch-Mirpur-Rajouri would
each have an executive head and council of ministers responsible to the
provincial legislature. The regional councils would administer Ladakh and
Gilgit. The State legislature would be empowered to alter the area of these
autonomous units and to establish new units. However, this plan also perished on
paper, since Sheikh Abdullah was not prepared to concede to Jammu and Ladakh the
very rights and privileges which he himself had demanded from the Indian state.
In the context of the Indian state’s relationship with J&K, the Sheikh had
argued:
“Enlightened
opinion in India recognised the vital human urges of Kashmiris and . . .
afforded them opportunities of achieving their political and social objectives.
This mutual accommodation of each other’s viewpoint, which has been accorded
constitutional sanction, should not be interpreted as a desire for separatism.
After all in a democratic country, the ultimate factor which decided the
relationship between various units is the measure of willingness of each of
these parts to come closer to each other for the common good of all. History has taught us that false notions of uniformity and conformity
have often led to disastrous consequences in the lives of many nations.”
(emphasis added)
But
when the leadership in Ladakh and Jammu argued that their status as a federating
unit of J&K would be a healthy unifying force among different peoples of the
State, the Sheikh backtracked.
Bakshi's
Regime of Handouts
After
Sheikh Abdullah's dismissal in 1953, his successor, Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi,
started on a good footing with the Centre's support and the goodwill of the
Jammu and Ladakh regions. He gave an assurance that rights and privileges
secured for the State as a whole would be shared in equal measure by the people
of different parts. Ladakh was better represented in this regime, both in the
National Conference party leadership and the State government. Kushak Bakula,
Deputy Minister of Ladakh Affairs, represented Ladakh for the first time.
However, Bakshi shared political power with other regions only to neutralise
their opposition. Kushak Bakula, for example, was inducted on the condition of
locating his ministry at Leh, "effectively reducing him to the position of
a District Officer." Bakula had no powers to make changes in the
administration, to create posts or to allocate funds.
Nevertheless,
compared to the total neglect during Abdullah’s regime, Ladakh now fared
better. During the Second Plan (1956-61), Rs 8.665 million was invested in the
region’s development. However, no major agricultural, industrial or power
generation projects were initiated during the ten years of Bakshi’s rule. As a
result, the people of Ladakh continued to nurse grievances against the
Valley’s dominance in the State’s power structures.
Ghulam
Mohammad Sadiq, who succeeded Bakshi in 1963, withdrew the system of direct
central administration - on the pattern of the North East Frontier Areas (NEFA)
- that had been introduced in Ladakh after the Chinese aggression in 1962. He
tried, however, to make amends by constituting a ten-member Ladakh Development
Commission with Kushak Bakula, the Minister of State for Ladakh Affairs, as the
chairman, and Agha Ibrahim Shah, Member of the Legislative Council from Kargil,
as the vice-chairman. The Commission was to advise the government on policies
for good governance and speedy development of Ladakh but, owing to several
limitations, it proved to be ineffective. Disillusioned by the discrimination
against Ladakh by successive State governments, the District National Congress
unit led by Kushak Bakula submitted a memorandum to the central government in
1967 seeking revival of a NEFA-type administration.
The
Communalisation of Political Processes
The
State government responded to Ladakh's demands for regional autonomy by
undercutting the political base of such groups and creating alternative
political alignments, often along communal lines. Sadiq promoted a new
leadership of lamas by supporting
Kushak Thiksey against Kushak Bakula on the one hand, and, on the other,
favoured the Muslim leadership of Kargil against the Buddhist leadership of Leh.
Political differences between Ladakhi Muslims and Buddhists were becoming
public. In 1969, several incidents, including the alleged desecration of the
Buddhist flag by a Muslim, the stoning of the Jama Masjid and Imam Bara by a
Buddhist procession, and subsequent reactions in Kargil, progressively divided
the two communities politically. The Buddhist Action Committee raised a number
of demands, including the status of a Scheduled Tribe for the Ladakhis, the
settlement of Tibetan refugees in Ladakh, construction of a rest house in
Kargil, recognition and introduction of the Bodhi language as a compulsory
subject up to high school, and the provision of a full-fledged cabinet minister
who would be the real representative of Ladakh. The agitation leader, Kushak
Tongdan, led a sit-down relay hunger strike in Leh bazaar and Nubra Valley. The
State government did induct Sonam Wangyal in the Cabinet, but the other demands
were not accepted, perhaps because they were opposed strongly by the Muslim
Action Committee, which feared that the Buddhist demand for settlement of
Tibetan refugees would upset the ethnic balance in the region.
This
was a game of building political majorities. The Ladakhi Buddhists were
suspicious and distrustful of the Kashmiri Muslim majority relegating them to a
minority within Ladakh, and hence the demand for settling the Tibetan refugees.
This was perceived as an attempt to build a Buddhist majority, arousing fear in
the Shia Muslim minority in Kargil, which, in turn, tried to forge a political
majority by joining hands with the Kashmiri Muslims, despite a complete absence
of cultural and ethnic similarities. A vicious circle resulted, leading to the
beginning of divisions among the Ladakhis into the Ladakhi Buddhists and the
Ladakhi Muslims, along a communal faultline.
After
his return to power in 1975, Sheikh Abdullah, once again, backtracked from his
commitment to create federal structures and reorganise the constitutional set-up
of the State. Nor was he willing to share political power equitably with the
constituent regions of Ladakh and Jammu. The
regional grievances of an inadequate share in the State’s developmental
allocations persisted. In a repeat performance of his first stint in office, all
office-bearers of the National Conference party organisation came from the
Valley. Deprived of their due share in state power, the people in Ladakh as well
as in Jammu started a movement to assert their respective regional identities.
The
Agitation for Regional Autonomy
In
1980, the police firing and lathi-charge
on Buddhist agitators protesting against the decision of the district authority
to transfer a diesel generator from Zanskar to Kargil snowballed into a mass
agitation in Ladakh. People of different shades of political opinion closed
ranks and set up the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee to express solidarity
with the people of Zanskar and demanded regional autonomy from the Kashmir
Valley. The State government was accused of treating them as slaves. Demanding
divisional status for Ladakh, the people demanded that their ‘homeland’ be
declared an autonomous region within the State. Following student demonstrations
in Poonch, Ladakhi Buddhists, for the first time, resorted to violence. The
protestors, including monks, held public meetings and pelted stones on being lathi-charged and tear-gassed by the police. Later, Border Security
Force (BSF) and Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) units were flown in to the
affected areas. On January 5, 1981, the Ladakh Action Committee launched a
full-fledged agitation.
Initially,
the State government responded positively and appointed a ministerial
sub-committee to look into their grievances. The Cabinet Committee held detailed
parleys with the Ladakh Action Committee from January 12 to 15, 1981, on a wide
range of subjects. They included plan allocations on a rational basis rather
than on the existing population basis, commissioning of hydel projects, improved
communications, adequate reservation of seats in professional institutions,
marketing facilities, construction of small dams, industrial development,
tourism, transport facilities, irrigation projects, development of culture and
language and the status of Scheduled Tribe for Ladakhis. The State government
promised to request the central government to grant tribal status, but resisted
sharing of political power with Ladakh. Citing the Sikri Commission Report,
Sheikh Abdullah denied the regional imbalances and discrimination suffered by
Leh district. The Ladakh Action Committee criticised the government’s
unrealistic yardstick for making development allocations ignoring the region’s
enormous size, scanty population, difficult terrain and general economic
backwardness. Sheikh Abdullah’s claim that Ladakh’s problems were being
looked after by a separate Ladakh Affairs Ministry did not stand scrutiny,
because, except for brief interludes, the Ministry was always headed by a
non-Ladakhi and did not enjoy significant powers and responsibility in respect
of Ladakh.
Frustrated
by the State government’s apathetic attitude and delaying tactics, the Ladakh
Action Committee resumed its agitation on January 15, 1982. There were violent
clashes between the demonstrators and police and Leh district experienced its
first curfew for four days. In sub-zero temperatures, 10,000 people gathered to
attend the funeral of their first martyrs. In a meeting with Prime Minister Mrs.
Gandhi, Kushak Bakula and P.Namgyal reiterated demands for regional autonomy and
tribal status. They argued that one-member representation of Leh district in the
State Assembly was inadequate and underlined the need for delimiting the
district into four assembly segments — Leh, Nubra, Changthang and Sha — and
a separate parliamentary seat for the Leh district. Sheikh Abdullah’s
government did not concede any of the demands of the Ladakh Action Committee.
Significant
intra-regional political differences in Ladakh emerged during this agitation.
Notwithstanding the nomenclature of the All-Party Ladakh Action Committee and
demands for regional autonomy of the Ladakh region and tribal status for the
Ladakhis, its predominantly Buddhist character was not coincidental. A parallel
Kargil Action Committee constituted by the National Conference and the Congress
raised a different slogan — ‘provincial status for the two districts of Leh
and Kargil’ on the pattern of Jammu & Kashmir divisions. The State
government subsequently used the Kargil Action Committee's stand to reject the
demand for regional autonomy on the plea that all Ladakhis did not want it.
The
Agitation for Union Territory Status
The secessionist movement in Kashmir that gained strength the late 1980s
was once again followed by voices of separatism in Ladakh. An agitation was
triggered by a scuffle between a Buddhist youth, Rigzin Zora, and four Muslims
in the Leh market on July 7, 1989, at which time a coalition government headed
by Farooq Abdullah was in power. The mishandling of the situation by the local
police and the State government’s refusal to appoint a commission of inquiry
exacerbated the situation. J&K Armed Police (JKAP), was subsequently
deployed, and fired at Buddhist processionists killing some protestors, forcibly
entered Buddhists’ houses, desecrated objects of worship, and resorted to
indiscriminate beating of locals and looting of property. These actions led the
LBA to embark upon a violent struggle, once again demanding the separate
constitutional status of a Union Territory for Ladakh. The movement emphasised
their poor and inadequate political representation in the State Assembly and
total neglect and discrimination in the socio-economic development of the
Buddhist-majority Leh district, and reiterated the general perception that the
Valley had always treated Ladakh ‘as a colony’.
As evidence, they cited the gross under-representation of Buddhists in
the State services and the ‘Kashmiri-run’ administration. The J&K
Secretariat had only one Buddhist
employee. Out of 200,000 government employees, only 2,900 were Ladakhis, and
there was no Buddhist among 18,000 employees of nine corporate sector units. Rs.
250 million was spent under the World Bank-aided Social Forestry Schemes, but
Leh district was ignored. It had no share in the funds disbursed by the Central
Land Development Bank and the Khadi and Village Industries Corporation in the
State. Between 1987 and 1989, the State government had received more than Rs.
One billion from the Prime Minister’s Special Assistance Fund, but Leh got
only Rs. 2.1 million. For tourism development schemes in 1990, a sum of Rs. 5.9
million was earmarked for the Valley; Leh was given only Rs 700,000, while the
neighbouring Kargil district received Rs. 1.7 million. Under the Jawahar Rozgar
Yojna, the Valley was given Rs 72 million, while Leh received just Rs. 2
million.
The State government was accused of adopting unrealistic norms for
allocation of Plan funds to Ladakh, of neglecting the power sector, and of
unimaginative planning of power projects. Srinagar refused the central energy
minister’s proposal for two National Hydel Power Corporation (NHPC) projects
in Leh and Kargil in 1988. Micro hydel projects at Basgo, Sumur and Hunder were
yet to be commissioned despite being launched a decade earlier. The State
government had withheld sanction for the Domkhar Hydel project that had been
technically cleared by the Central Water Commission years earlier. Work on the
Kumdok, Tagtse and Bogdang micro hydel projects, had not progressed beyond
perfunctory surveys for ten years. Another case in point was the Stakna Hydel
Project, which took over 25 years to build, cost nearly Rs 350 million, was
operational for barely four months a year and produced just 2 MW electricity.
The Buddhists obviously resented the neglect of the rich Bodhi language
and the imposition of Urdu as the medium of instruction for Ladakhi children.
Although 84 per cent of the population of Leh district is Buddhist, Bodhi
teachers were provided in only 32 of the 252 government schools. Despite
specific recommendations of the Gajendragadkar Commission, the State government
had not set up a degree college for the 200,000 inhabitants of the region.
Successive State governments were also accused of 'Islamising' Ladakh by
encouraging Buddhists’ conversion to Islam, with the ulterior motive of
disturbing Ladakh’s demographic balance. More significantly, the systematic
dismantling of important forums for Ladakh’s development, such as the Ladakh
Affairs Department, the absence of Ladakhi representatives in Farooq
Abdullah’s coalition government and the Buddhists’ one seat in Ladakh’s
share of four seats in the State Assembly, had resulted in simmering discontent
among the Ladakhi Buddhists.
The Buddhists increasingly accused the ‘Kashmiri Sunni Muslims’ of
practicing ‘majoritarian politics’ driven by communal considerations, and of
dominating Leh’s administration and economy. Kashmiri Muslims bagged the
development contracts for constructing buildings, roads and bridges in
connivance with the Kashmiri-dominated bureaucracy. Kashmiri hotel-owners and
traders called the shots in Leh’s market. They had reaped most of the benefits
from the influx of foreign tourists into Ladakh since 1975 and they, according
to the Buddhists, were instigating the local Muslims — Argons — to flex their muscles in a way that ‘the 15 per cent
minority [of Muslims] wanted to dictate terms to the [Buddhist] majority’.
Social Boycott
As a consequence of the agitation, the Buddhists boycotted the Kashmiri
Muslims. Valley traders soon vanished from the Leh market and their hotels and
restaurants were shut down. The entire Kashmiri officialdom fled Leh, Khalsi,
Nubra and Zanskar areas. Violence was more severe in the villages, where Muslim
houses were burnt and crops were damaged. Some Muslims were forced to convert to
Buddhism. In retaliation, Ladakhi students studying in colleges at Srinagar and
Buddhist pavement hawkers were sufficiently intimidated to leave the Valley.
Subsequently, the social boycott was extended to the local Muslims. The
Buddhists avoided the Muslim areas and did not enter hotels, restaurants or
shops run by Muslims. Farmers were prohibited from exchanging tools. All
Buddhist houses sported brightly-hued flags and vehicles driven or owned by
Buddhists bore yellow stickers. No inter-religious marriages were allowed and
meetings among relatives of different faiths were stopped. Violators faced
punitive action by the LBA. For example, its ‘mobile magistrates’ imposed
on-the-spot fines on Buddhists buying goods from Muslim shops. Social boycott
ruptured the centuries-old bonds of amity between the Ladakhi Muslims and
Buddhists. Interestingly, even its proponents could not justify it except as a
‘tactical move’. At the peak of the boycott, LBA leader Rigzin Zora
described it in the neutral terms of a ‘non-cooperation’ policy and later
admitted that it was ‘an exercise in arm-twisting… and was crude,
uncivilised and unbecoming of us’. Nonetheless, many stressed that
though unfortunate, it was necessary to
drive the point home that the Muslims local minority should not bank upon the
Kashmiri Sunni Muslim majority in the State to dictate terms to us [the local
majority]. A common refrain was that ‘It taught them (the Muslims) a lesson as
they had allowed themselves to be instigated by forces in the Valley’.
The Buddhists launched a civil disobedience movement against the J&K
government with an indefinite strike by Buddhist government employees from
September 2, 1989. Government officials were not allowed to visit Buddhist
villages and houses and contractors and labourers stalled work on State
government projects. The government machinery was paralysed. Denouncing
‘Kashmir’s imperialism’ and ‘hegemonism’, the LBA activists call was
to ‘free Ladakh from Kashmir’. The LBA president asserted that 'the Kashmiri
rulers have been systematically eroding the Buddhists’ ethnic and cultural
identity for the last forty-two years and it can be saved only by making Ladakh
a Union territory.' The Kargil Muslims (comprising nearly half the region’s
population) resolutely opposed this. The government agreed to negotiate with the
LBA leaders in view of their threat to boycott the impending general elections.
Proposal for
Autonomous Hill Council
At the tripartite talks between the central government, the State
government and LBA leaders on October 29, 1989, an agreement was reached whereby
the LBA withdrew its demand for Union Territory status in favour of an
Autonomous Hill Council on the lines of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council. The
LBA leaders realised that Union Territory status would require an amendment to
Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which would be a virtually impossible
task given the hostility of the Kargil Muslims and the Kashmiri leadership. The
Hill Council was accepted as a compromise to provide a mechanism for
self-governance by granting autonomy to Ladakh in administration, economy and
planning.
After the Congress(I)’s ouster at the Centre, however, the tripartite
agreement on the Autonomous Hill Council (AHC) remained on paper. V.P. Singh's
and Chandra Shekhar’s subsequent governments took no interest in Ladakhi
issues, and the proposal was revived only after the Congress returned to power
in 1991. The central government then impressed upon the LBA leadership to
secularise its political demands, and the then Union Home Minister, S.B. Chavan,
insisted on the lifting of the social boycott of Muslims. Consequently, talks
between the LBA and the Ladakh Muslim Association (LMA) ended the boycott. The
Buddhists relented because they needed the LMA’s support, and the latter
acquiesced because its demand that ‘concessions to Ladakhis should not be
given in the name of a communal body’ was conceded. The two organisations
joined hands to demand a Hill Council, and the Ladakhis gained the support of
all the people of Leh. The Kashmiri leadership, however, strongly opposed the
Hill Council and succeeded in deferring its implementation. The Centre
backtracked to avoid ‘rubbing the Kashmiri leadership on the wrong side’ and
jeopardising efforts to restore normalcy in the Valley. It was precisely this
kind of Valley-centric thinking that had alienated the people of Ladakh, who
believed that the Centre belittled and disregarded their aspirations because
they had not challenged India’s political and security interests nor
‘resorted to the gun’ against the state. The LBA leaders were at pains to
explain that ‘our religious beliefs of ahimsa
and peaceful co-existence do not approve of violence… but we are being
forced to lose our identity and fight for our dues. They reasoned:
While the government has conducted negotiations with the militant
movement of Bodos and ULFA of Assam, Ladakhis have been neglected just because
they have chosen to follow the ideals of ahimsa
in redressing their demand. We fear we too will have to deviate from our
cherished ideals of non-violence to drive home the point to the government that
our demand is just, democratic and constitutional.
With this opinion gaining ground, the LBA leaders and heads of Buddhist
monasteries threatened a revival of the agitation and a possible recourse to
violence. The LBA president, Thupstang Chhewang, warned that "the simmering
passions of Ladakhis especially the younger generation might lead to
establishment of their links with anti-social elements if the sentiments of
Ladakhis are not respected."
In October 1993, the tripartite talks reached agreement
on setting up the Ladakh Autonomous Hill Council at Leh. The government assured
enactment of the requisite legislation in three months, but nothing happened.
Frequent deferment of the Hill Council disturbed the youth who revived the
agitation in April 1995. They threatened to start a violent struggle if the
Union government failed to introduce a comprehensive Bill on the autonomous
status of the Hill Council, or if it did not honestly implement the agreed
decision in the stipulated time.
The Autonomous
Hill Council Act
The P.V. Narasimha Rao government finally relented, and the Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Council Act was enacted on May 9, 1995. The Act provided for an
Autonomous Hill Council each for Leh and Kargil, and an inter-district advisory
council to advise them on matters of common interest to both districts, and to
resolve their differences and preserve communal harmony in Ladakh. Councils were
to have tenures of five years. The objectives of decentralisation and devolution
of powers were clearly affirmed in the 'Reasons for Enactment' that conclude the
official text of the Act:
Ladakh region is geographically isolated with a sparse population, a vast
area and inhospitable terrain which remains land-locked (sic) for nearly six months in a year. Consequently, the people of
the area have had a distinct regional identity and special problems distinct
from those of the other areas of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The people of
Ladakh have, for a long time, been demanding effective local institutional
arrangements which can help to promote and accelerate the pace of development
and equitable all-around growth and development having regard to its peculiar
geoclimatic and locational conditions, and stimulate fullest participation of
the local community in the decision-making process. It is felt that
decentralisation of power by formation of Hill Councils for the Ladakh region
would give a boost to the people of the said region. The present measure is
enacted to achieve the above objective.
The Leh Council has twenty-six elected members and four nominated by the
State government from among the principal minority, women and two eminent
persons. The Council has an executive body of five councillors, including one
Muslim. The sitting Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and Members of
Parliament (MPs) are ex-officio members, but without voting rights. The Leh
Council has 26 territorial constituencies whose boundaries were drawn in
collaboration between State officials and local leaders so as to ensure adequate
representation from the sparsely populated regions of the district, and to
prevent domination by central Ladakh (Leh and surrounding areas in the Indus
Valley).
The executive powers and functions of the Council included allotment, use
and occupation of land vested in the Council by the government, formulation and
review of development programmes for the district, budget (Plan and non-Plan),
formulation of guidelines for the implementation of schemes at the grassroots
level, special measures for employment generation and poverty alleviation,
promotion of co-operative institutions and local culture and languages,
management of un-demarcated forests and canals or watercourses for agriculture,
desert development, tourism planning, promotion and development; and
preservation of the environment and ecology of the area. The Council has
extensive rights to collect State taxes and levy local taxes and fees of
different kinds, including taxes on grazing, business, transport, entertainment
and 'temporary occupation of village sites and roads.' The Council also has the
power to hire and fire public servants of all but the very highest ranks, and
all government employees except those in the judiciary and police are
'transferred' to the Council, although it remains at the discretion of the
government to recall them. In theory, then, the Council enjoys considerable
powers and freedom to formulate its own development plans. Yet, just five years
after the enactment, the Council has lost almost all local support, has managed
to achieve little or no change in development policies, and appears to be in
disarray ideologically, politically and administratively.
Voices From Kargil
While Leh’s Buddhist minority (in the State) felt insecure about the
Muslim-majority Valley dominating Ladakh, the Shia Muslims of Kargil believed
that Buddhist-majority Leh overshadowed Kargil’s identity. The people of
Kargil strongly resented the Leh-centric conception of the Ladakh region, which,
until the 1980s, had all the district headquarters and central government
offices. Keeping in mind the religious affinity, close economic links and
political alignments with the Valley, Kargilis traditionally have identified
with the Kashmiri leadership, although they did not support the secessionist
movement in the Valley. The Centre is blamed for Kargil’s backwardness, lack
of an airport and discriminatory policies in recruitment to the Ladakh Scouts.
Compared to Leh, the political equations are clearly reversed in Kargil.
That is precisely why the Kargil Muslims did not accept an Autonomous
Hill Council, although its leaders across the political spectrum supported the
idea in principle. Stressing that ‘they have not rejected the Autonomous Hill
Council but only postponed the decision’ until the turmoil in the Valley was
resolved, Kargilis did not wish to antagonise the Kashmiri leadership,
respecting the latter’s denouncement of an Autonomous Hill Council as
‘amounting to Kashmir’s territorial disintegration’. Many shared the view
that "Kashmiris have always stood by us… We owe it to them." Another
complicating factor in this political equation is injected by the Buddhist
minority in the Zanskar area of the Kargil district. A small Buddhist community
of 18,000 in Zanskar feels neglected and discriminated against by the Kargil
Muslim-majority administration. Their long-standing demands for a monastery, serai
and cremation ground in Kargil town are cited as examples. Kargil leaders, on
the other hand, are indignant about Zanskar’s demand for a separate sub-hill
council when they themselves have not accepted an Autonomous Hill Council for
Kargil district. Echoing the LBA’s arguments in Leh’s context, they argue
that the "minority [Buddhists] must live according to the [Muslim]
majority’s considerations and support Kargil’s interests." This,
however, did not deter the Zanskar’s Buddhist Youth Association President,
Tsewang Chostar, from sitting on a dharna
in May 1995 to demand a separate State Assembly constituency for Zanskar,
because it remains totally cut off from the rest for the State for eight months
in a year.
The Kargil Crisis
The present agitation, launched in June 2000 by Ladakhi Buddhists, can,
consequently, be seen as the revival of their long-standing demand for direct
administration from New Delhi. In the current context, however, this movement
also has far-reaching implications for India's security, as well as for the
political future of the State of J&K. After a gap of nearly forty years
since the Chinese aggression in 1962, the Kargil crisis in May 1999 once again
brought home the political and strategic significance of the Ladakh region.
Kargil is the only sector on the Line of Control where the Pakistan Army
enjoys the advantage of higher positions. In capturing the heights at Dras,
Kargil and Batalik, Pakistan's military planners had exposed the Achille's heel
of the Indian Army, catching the latter napping in a strategically important
area. Pakistan's scheme sought to establish dominance over the captured high
ridges, so that the Indian army would find it impossible to dislodge it, and
would consequently acquiesce to the loss of territory just as Pakistan did to
the seizure of Siachen Glacier in 1984. However, the Atal Behari Vajpayee
government's decision to unleash the Air Force and bombard enemy posts in Kargil
and, the Indian military victories on the ground in the recapture of the
Tololing heights, followed by the strategically important Tiger Hill in the Dras
sector and Jubar Hill in the Batalik sector, backed by international pressure,
forced Pakistan to withdraw its troops.
While the intruders were thrown out of Indian territory, Pakistan has
succeeded in turning Kashmir into India's festering wound. The cost of manning
the Kargil border alone has been estimated at Rs. 18 billion a year. That is a
huge drain on the exchequer, even higher than the defence of Siachen. More
importantly, there were indications that Pakistan was trying to extend its proxy
war through infiltration and dumping of arms and ammunition in the hitherto
'clean' Ladakh region. In the 'first ever arms seizure' in this region, Leh
police seized a large cache of sophisticated arms and ammunition, including 25
AK-47 and-56 rifles, one LMG, one MMG, plastic explosives, one rocket launcher,
three rockets, fifteen hand grenades, three batteries, fuse wire and a sniper
rifle, and arrested 24 people from the border villages of Thang, Tyakshi,
Pachathang and Turtuk. They also discovered that several young men of the border
villages had been crossing, over several weeks, to Skardu in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (PoK) for arms training. On their return, many infiltrated the armed
forces as well as civilian agencies. For instance, the Leh police arrested two
constables — Mohammad Ali and Ahmed Shah — from Thang village.
Significantly, Ibrahim, an undercover agent working for the Intelligence Bureau
(IB), had switched sides and turned out to be the major conduit for arms and
ammunition dumped in the upper-Ladakh region to foment insurgency.
The local Shia Muslim population of Kargil district, though sympathetic
to the Kashmiri cause, had generally refrained from joining the ranks of the
militants. Nevertheless, the massive scale and an uncanny accuracy of the
Pakistani artillery shelling that resulted in the destruction of an ammunition
depot worth Rs One billion and a television tower, followed by the shelling of
the district and military administration headquarters in the nearby Baru area,
led the security forces to suspect that Pakistani artillery was being directed
from the Kargil area by an enemy agent with a high frequency wireless set. The
Indian Army's recovery of Indian cement bags (purchased from Dras for casting
slabs to fortify bunkers), receipts of payments made to a mason in Dras and the
Pakistan Army's 'out-passes' to Srinagar from the intruders' bunkers in Dras,
also indicated a possible and substantial collusion between some local citizens
and Pakistani intruders.
With
a continuing battle raging in the highest and most inhospitable terrain in
Siachen and Pakistan opening a new military front in Kargil, the military and
strategic significance of the Ladakh region cannot be over-stated. While
the Indian Army has launched a drive to procure sophisticated military equipment
for effective surveillance, no borders can be secured without the support of the
local populace. Notably, both during the 1965 War and, according to some
accounts, the intrusions in Kargil, first reports of intrusions were received
from local shepherds. There is, clearly, a great deal of popular antipathy to
the Pakistani position in this region, and this needs to be consolidated. The
Indian Army has already initiated several steps in this direction. A new Corps
has been raised, and this will generate more employment and give a boost to
development activities in the areas across the Zojila Pass. Ghulam Hassan Khan,
the National Conference MP from Kargil, pointed out, "till yesterday, the
representation of Kargil (read Muslim instead of Kargil) was not even one per
cent in Ladakh Scouts, ITBP, ITBF, SSB, Railways and nationalised banks because
it was a Congress decision to deny these rights to Kargil. Army's transport
contracts and vegetable supply orders would go to Leh 'come what may'." The
situation has now changed and, without prejudice, Khan does concede that over
300 persons have been recruited from the area (community) into these
institutions in the post-Kargil days. "The SSB has set up a unit in Kargil.
Over 70 youth were recruited into the ITBP and the Ladakh Scouts. The Army has
given enough contracts to the Kargil transporters for the first time in the
history." The importance of recruiting locals was realized at the time of
Kargil crisis, when the Indian Army required substantial numbers of soldiers and
porters who were well acclimatised and familiar with the mountainous terrain, as
also for translating the intercepts of infiltrators' communications in the
Pushto, Persian, Balti, Ladakhi and Skardu dialects of Kargili.
A
more serious challenge, however, is for the State and central governments to
arrest the communalisation of political processes in the Ladakh region. In this
context, the Regional Autonomy Committee (RAC) Report's recommendations
subjecting Ladakh to an ‘undisguised communal cleaver’ needs to be seriously
reviewed. The Report recommended breaking up the mountainous region into two new
provinces consisting of just one district each — predominantly Buddhist Leh
and predominantly Muslim Kargil. Ladakh
had already been sundered by its division into two districts (Leh and Kargil) by
Sheikh Abdullah in 1979, and Kargil had been excluded from the Ladakh Autonomous
Council set up in 1995. The transfiguration of two districts into two provinces
would serve only to sharpen communal and ethnic boundaries.
The
RAC Report has failed entirely to provide a logical, cogent and uniform
rationale for restructuring the State into the eight proposed provinces, except
a brief and sweeping statement that "the prevailing classification of
provinces/divisions is hampering the process of social and human development and
that it was coming in the way of democratic participation at the grassroots
level within the state." Yet, the Report also recommends that "the
government may consider setting up of District Councils as an alternative to the
Regional/Provincial Councils." Such district councils were clearly
irreconcilable with the assertions of the preceding paragraph, since they would
work within the existing provincial arrangement. Also, while the Committee
rightly questioned the administrative inclusion of Ladakh into the Kashmir
region, it failed to rectify this anomaly by granting independent provincial
status to Ladakh. It is also important to note that while the J&K
Legislative Assembly had unanimously passed an identically worded State Act to
replace the Autonomous Hill Council Act of the central government in October
1997, Farooq Abdullah made it clear that the measure was 'a temporary one'. The
introduction of the Panchayati Raj Act in J&K further complicates the issue.
All this illustrates the temporary and precarious nature of Leh's newly won
autonomy. It is the uncertainty of the political future of the Leh Hill Council
and the State Assembly's resolution adopting the State RAC's Report without
instituting political mechanisms for equitable sharing of political power with
the constituent regions of Jammu and Ladakh, that provides the context for the
revival of the LBA's demand for Union Territory status. In a week-long stir
in June 2000, LBA President Tsering Samphel said "we (Ladakhis) have always
been treated with contempt, be it employment, education or infrastructure. The
only way out is to let Ladakh assume a Union Territory status." He
threatened that, if this demand was not met, "the Ladakhis… would seek
the option of looking for a mass asylum in some foreign country… but certainly
not with China which has ravaged our culture in Tibet… we would approach the
United Nations pleading to somehow protect our cultural identity".While
Samphel reiterated that the LBA "would continue to abide by the Buddhist
religious codes even while taking an agitational path", Goy Lobzang
Nyantak, the youth-wing leader of the LBA, sought to caution the state
government as well as the Centre that "the God-fearing folk of this region
would be forced to take up arms if their long-pending demand remained
ignored…[and] it will only be for the administration to blame if we happened
to resort to a warpath. It (violence) may appear anti-religious, but the motive,
nonetheless, is to protect our identity." While the demand for Union
Territory status enjoys support from across the political spectrum of the
Congress and the Bharatiya Janata party (BJP) in the Leh district, its prospects
are not bright, since it is vehemently opposed by the Kargilis who comprise
nearly half the population of the region.
The best course available to the Farooq Abdullah government is to
strengthen the Leh Autonomous Hill Council (LAHC), especially now, since Kargil
is also seriously rethinking the idea of a development council, an offer which
they had turned down in 1995. There are three main reasons in support of such a
course of action. First, the funds for the LAHC do not lapse. Second, the latter
has the power of recruitment as well as the power of postings at the local
level. Third, development has significant local participation. As Ghulam Hassan
Khan, the National Conference M.P from Kargil, put it, "when the Plan money
will come in September, we will have just a month or so for spending it, unlike
Leh where they would keep it in the account and spend it at the proper time with
interest." With a growing realisation of the significance of an autonomous
hill council, the people of Kargil are seriously reconsidering the prospects of
accepting the hill council offer, which will help the district grow.
Conclusion
Prime
Minister Vajpayee's decision to initiate the peace process with Kashmiris by
opening the doors of dialogue to the Hurriyat Conference as well as the militant
leadership of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, within the larger framework of insaniyat, is a momentous step in the right direction. While this
is, no doubt, critical to bringing peace to the Valley, the coalition government
at the Centre, must not lose sight of the political aspirations of the people of
Ladakh and Jammu. The simmering passions of Ladakhis must be creatively
channelized into processes of political participation and the development of the
region. The peace process must encompass a dialogue with all
the people of the State because a just and lasting peace in J&K can only
be brought about by creating a set of political mechanisms that provide a sense
of belonging and participation to all sub-national and sub-regional communities
and group identities.